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Abstract
The independent choice logic (ICL) is part of a project to combine logic and decision/game
theory into a coherent framework. The ICL has a simple possible-worlds semantics character-
ised by independent choices and an acyclic logic program that specifies the consequences of
these choices. This paper gives an abductive characterization of the ICL. The ICL is defined
model-theoretically, but we show that it is naturally abductive: the set of explanations of a
proposition g is a concise description of the worlds in which g is true. We give an algorithm
for computing explanations and show it is sound and complete with respect to the possible-
worlds semantics. What is unique about this approach is that the explanations of the negation
of g can be derived from the explanations of g. The use of probabilities over choices in this
framework and going beyond acyclic logic programs are also discussed. Ó 2000 Elsevier Sci-
ence Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Abduction; Negation as failure; Stable models; Probability; Decision theory;
Possible worlds; Independent choice logic; Acyclic logic programs
1. Introduction
This paper is part of a project aimed at combining logic and decision or game the-
ory into a coherent framework [22,24]. This project follows from the work on prob-
abilistic Horn abduction [19], which showed how a combination of independent
probabilistic hypotheses and a restricted acyclic logic program (without negation
as failure) that gives the consequences of the choices, can represent any probability
distribution in much the same way as do Bayesian networks [17].
The independent choice logic (ICL) [22] builds on probabilistic Horn abduction
to extend the logic to include arbitrary acyclic logic programs (that can include
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negation as failure) and allow dierent agents to make choices. The general idea is to
have a structured hypothesis space, and an acyclic logic program to give the conse-
quences of hypotheses. The hypotheses are partitioned into alternatives. The set of all
alternatives is a choice space. There is a possible world for each selection of one el-
ement from each alternative; the logic program specifies what is true in that world.
The semantics of negation as failure is given in terms of stable models. This frame-
work is defined model-theoretically but, as we show in this paper, it is naturally ab-
ductive: the set of explanations of a proposition g is a concise description of the
worlds in which g is true. We give an algorithm for computing explanations and
show it is sound and complete. What is unique about this approach is that the expla-
nations of the negation of g can be derived from the explanations of g; the algorithm
is based on Reiter’s [27] hitting set algorithm.
In other work [22], we consider how this framework can be used for modelling mul-
tiple agents under uncertainty in a way that extends decision and game theory. By al-
lowing dierent agents to make independent choices, the semantic framework extends
the notion of the strategic or normal form of a game [29] by allowing for a logic pro-
gram to model the dynamics of the world and the capabilities of agents. One of the
agents can be nature; in this case we have probability distributions over alternatives,
with the alternatives corresponding to independent random variables [19]. We have
also investigated using the situation calculus in the same framework [24].
The goal of abduction [12,25] is to explain why some observed proposition is true;
we want a description of what the (real) world may be like to account for the observa-
tion. The input is a set of assumables (possible hypotheses), a logical theory that axi-
omatises what follows from the assumables, and an observation to be explained.Given
an observation we want the explanations to be descriptions of how the world could be
to produce the observation: formally we want a consistent set of assumables that log-
ically implies the observations. Thus abduction is inherently about partial informa-
tion; before wemake an observation we do not knowwhich assumptions we will make.
In contrast, negation as failure [5] is about complete knowledge. If some atom
cannot be proved, its negation is inferred. In combining negation as failure with ab-
duction, we have complete knowledge about some predicates even though we may
only have partial knowledge about others [6,9,20]. There are many areas where we
want negation as failure to mean that all of the cases for a predicate have been cov-
ered even though we may not have complete knowledge about all of the atoms that
make up the definition. For , there is a neat solution to the frame problem using logic
programming and negation as failure [1,14,28], which can still be used even if we do
not have complete knowledge about all of the atoms in the bodies. Consider the fol-
lowing example:
Example 1.1. Consider a simple domain where there is a robot and a key, and the
robot can pick up or put down the key, and move to dierent locations. We can write
rules such as, the robot is carrying the key after it has (successfully) picked it up:1
1 We are using Prolog’s convention with variables in upper case, but with negation written as , and
conjunction as ^. This axiomatisation is similar to a situation calculus definition, but what whether action
is attempted at any time is a proposition. This is closer to the event calculus [15], where we are explicitly
interested in narratives [28].
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carryingkey; sT   
dopickupkey; T ^
atrobot; Pos; T ^
atkey; Pos; T ^
pickup succeedsT :
Together with this rule that specifies when carrying commences, we need a frame rule
to specify when carrying persists. The general form of a frame axiom specifies that a
fluent is true after a situation if it were true before, and the action were not one that
undid the fluent, and there was no other mechanism that undid the fluent. For exam-
ple, an agent is carrying the key as long as the action was not to put down the key or
pick up the key, and the agent did not accidentally drop the key while carrying out
another action:2
carryingkey; sT   
carryingkey; T ^
 doputdownkey; T ^
 dopickupkey; T ^
 dropskey; T :
These two rules cover all of the cases when the robot is carrying the key. By these
rules, we really mean the completion: the robot is carrying the key if and only if
one of these two cases occurs. However, we do not want to globally assume complete
knowledge. For example, we may not know whether pickup succeeds or whether the
robot drops the key (the ICL [22] allows uncertainty expressed as probabilities for
these atoms; see Section 5).
Suppose we have some explanations for why the robot may drop the key.3 Each
such explanation will serve to describe conditions in which the agent drops the key.
In all other situations, the agent wo would not drop the key, and so, assuming the
agent is carrying the key and does not put down or pickup the key, should serve
for explanations for the agent carrying the key in the next state. What distinguished
this work is the interaction of abduction and negation as failure. A set of explana-
tions for dropskey; T  will induce another set of explanations for  dropskey; T ,
which then can be used to find explanations for carryingkey; sT . These, in turn,
could be used to derive explanations for  carryingkey; sT . In the independent
2 Note that  dopickupkey; T  is an element of the body of this rule because we do not want both rules
to be applicable when the agent is carrying the key and tries to pick it up. In that case, for the sake of
making a choice, we assume the action is like the case when it just picks up the key.
3 To contrast this with other work on abductive logic programming [11,12], consider the case where
dropkey; T  is not a logical consequence of the clauses and no explanations for dropkey; T  involve proofs
that use negation as failure. In standard abductive logic programming, no hypotheses need to be added to
explain  dropskey; T . Any explanations for dropkey; T  serve only to disallow other combinations of
assumptions.
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choice logic, this abductive characterization is a consequence of an independently de-
fined model-theoretic semantics for the logic.
We first overview the ICL and give a model theoretic semantics [22]. The main
contribution of this paper is to provide an abductive characterisation of the logic
in terms of operations on sets of assumptions (in terms of composite choices) and
how the assumptions interact with the logic programs. We show how the abductive
machinery can be used for probabilistic reasoning and for Bayesian decision theory,
and finally discuss going beyond acyclic logic programs.
2. Background: acyclic logic programs
We use the Prolog conventions with variables starting an upper case letter and
constants, function symbols, and predicate symbols starting with lower case letters.
A term is either a variable, a constant, of is of the form f t1; . . . ; tm where f is a
function symbol and t1; . . . ; tm are terms. An atomic formula (atom) is either a pred-
icate symbol or is of the form pt1; . . . ; tm where p is a predicate symbol and
t1; . . . ; tm are terms. A formula is either an atom or is of the form  f , f ^ g or
f _ g; where f and g are formulae. A clause is either an atom or is a rule of the form
a f where a is an atom and f is a formula (the body of the clause). A logic program
is a set of clauses.
A ground term is a term that does not contain any variables. A ground instance of
a term/atom/clause c is a term/atom/clause obtained by uniformly replacing ground
terms for the variables in c. The Herbrand base is the set of ground instances of the
atoms in the language (inventing a new constant if the language does not contain any
constants). A Herbrand interpretation is an assignment of true or false to each ele-
ment of the Herbrand base. If P is a program, let grP  be the set of ground instances
of elements of P.
Definition 2.1 [10]. Interpretation M is a stable model 4 of logic program F if for ev-
ery ground atom h, h is true in M if and only if either h 2 grF or there is a rule
h b in grF such that b is true in M. Conjunction f ^ g is true in M if both f
and g are true in M. Disjunction f _ g is true in M if either f or g (or both) are true
in M. Negation  f is true in M if and only if f is not true in M.
Definition 2.2 [1]. A logic program F is acyclic if there is an assignment of a nat-
ural number (non-negative integer) to each element of the Herbrand base of F
such that, for every rule in grF  the number assigned to the atom in the head
of the rule is greater than the number assigned to each atom that appears in
the body.
4 This is a slight generalization of the normal definition of a stable model to include more general bodies
in clauses. This is done here because it is easier to describe the abductive operations in terms of the
standard logical operators. Note that under this definition b  a is the same as b a.
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Acyclic programs are surprisingly general. Note that acyclicity does not preclude
recursive definitions. It just means that all such definitions have to be well founded.
They have very nice semantic properties, including the following that are used in this
paper:
Theorem 2.1 [1]. Acyclic logic programs have the following properties:
1. There is a unique stable model.
2. Clark’s completion [5] characterises what is true in this model.
Section 7 discusses where we may want to go beyond acyclic programs.
3. Independent choice logic
In this section we define the semantics of the ICL where the base logic is the set of
acyclic logic programs under the stable model semantics. Section 4 gives an abduc-
tive characterisation of the logic.
Definition 3.1. An independent choice logic theory is a pair hC;Fi, where:
• C, the choice space, is a set of non-empty sets of ground atomic formulae, such
that if v1 2 C, v2 2 C and v1 6 v2 then v1 \ v2  fg. An element of C is called
an alternative. An element of an alternative is called an atomic choice.
• F, the facts, is an acyclic logic program such that no atomic choice unifies with the
head of any rule.
In this paper we assume that each alternative is finite, and that there are countably
many alternatives.
The semantics is defined in terms of possible worlds. There is a possible world for
each selection of one element from each alternative. The atoms which follow from
these atoms together with F are true in this possible world. This is formalised in
the next two definitions.
Definition 3.2. Given independent choice logic theory hC;Fi, a selector function is a
mapping s : C! [C such that sv 2 v for all v 2 C. The range of selector function
s, written Rs is the set fsv : v 2 Cg. The range of a selector function is called a
total choice.
Definition 3.3. Suppose we are given ICL theory hC;Fi. For each selector function s,
we construct a possible world ws. If f is a closed formula, and ws is a possible world, f
is true in world ws based on hC;Fi, written ws hC;Fi f , if f is true in the (unique) sta-
ble model of F [ Rs. f is false in world ws otherwise.
When understood from context, the hC;Fi is omitted as a subscript of . The
uniqueness of the model follows from the acyclicity of F [ Rs.
Note that, for each alternative v 2 C and for each world ws, there is exactly one
element of v that is true in ws. In particular, ws  sv, and ws  a for all
a 2 vÿ fsvg.
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4. Abductive characterisation of the ICL
The semantic framework here, with probabilities on the choices5 and acyclic logic
programs without negation as failure (with some other restrictions that are relaxed
here; see Section 8.3) was the basis for probabilistic Horn abduction [19]. One of
the main results of Ref. [19] (proven in Appendix A of that paper) was that the
set of minimal explanations of g is a concise description of the possible worlds in
which g is true.
In this paper we give an abductive characterisation of the above semantic defini-
tion of consequence that allows for negation as failure. In particular, the explana-
tions of a proposition will be a description of the set of possible worlds in which
the proposition is true. This can be related to previous work on abductive logic pro-
gramming [12], but there is a dierent interaction between abduction and negation as
failure. If g has some set of explanations, then  g also has a set of explanations
which are the dual of the explanations of g (Section 4.2). We interpret negation quite
dierently from the interpretation as ‘‘failure to prove’’ [5] that is appropriate when
there is complete knowledge of all propositions. Negation is interpreted with respect
to each world;  g is true in a world if g is false in the stable model defining that
world. This is in contrast to the view that  g means that g cannot be proved – there
may be many proofs for g (each relying on dierent assumptions) but this does not
mean we can’t also explain  g. Section 8.2 discusses the relationship with abductive
logic programming in more detail.
4.1. Composite choices
The notion of a composite choice is defined to allow us to partition the worlds ac-
cording to which atomic choices are true. This forms the basis for the abductive char-
acterisation.
Definition 4.1. A set j of atomic choices is consistent with respect to choice space C if
there is no alternative which contains more than one element of j. Where C is un-
derstood from context, we just say that j is consistent. A consistent set of atomic
choices is called a composite choice. If A is a set of alternatives, a composite choice
on A is a set of atomic choices that contains exactly one member of each element
of A (and no other members).
A consistent set of atomic choices is satisfiable: it can always be extended to a to-
tal choice, which is true in a possible world.
The following lemma shows the relationship between composite choices and total
choices.
Lemma 4.1. A set of atomic choices is a total choice if and only if it is a maximal
composite choice.
5 There is a probability distribution on each alternative (a function P0 : [C! 0; 1 such that for all
v 2 C, Pa2v P0a  1), where the dierent alternatives are probabilistically unconditionally independent
(see Section 5).
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This is because each total choice is a composite choice, and there is no composite
choice that is a (strict) superset. Each maximal composite choice is the range of a se-
lector function and so is a total choice.
The elements of a composite choice are implicitly conjoined: composite choice v is
true in world ws, written ws  v, if v  Rs. A set of composite choices is implicitly
disjoined: a set of composite choices is true in a world ws if one of the elements is true
in ws. Thus a set of composite choices can be seen as a DNF formula made up of
atomic choices.
Definition 4.2. Two composite choices are compatible if their union is consistent. A
set K of composite choices is mutually incompatible if for all j1 2 K, j2 2 K, j1 6 j2
implies j1 [ j2 is inconsistent.
Given the syntactic definitions of incompatible and mutually incompatible, we can
give an equivalent semantic characterisation:
Lemma 4.2. Two composite choices are compatible if and only if there is a world in
which they are both true. A set K of composite choices is mutually incompatible if
and only if there is no world in which more than one element of K is true.
We use sets of composite choices as descriptions of sets of worlds. These are typ-
ically much more concise descriptions than describing the possible worlds directly
(see Section 6). This is used to develop an abductive characterisation of the ICL.
In order to develop the theory, we define some operations on composite choices.
The first is finding the complement of a set of composite choices (a set of composite
choices that describe the complementary sets of worlds to the original set), and the
notion of a dual, which is a syntactic operation to find a complementary set of com-
posite choices. We then give an abductive characterisation of the ICL, where expla-
nations of a formula correspond to composite choices that entail the formula. This
characterisation shows the interaction between the choices and the rules. In partic-
ular, negation as failure is handled using the duals of sets of explanations. The final
operation is splitting composite choices which is useful for making mutually incom-
patible sets of composite choices that describe the same set of possible worlds as the
original.
4.2. Duals and complements
If K is a set of composite choices describing a set of worlds, we often want a de-
scription of all of the other worlds. This will be crucial in defining abduction through
negation as failure; if some set of composite choices describes the worlds in which g is
true, then g is false in all of the other worlds, so  g is true in these other worlds.
Definition 4.3. If K is a set of composite choices, then a complement of K is a set K0 of
composite choices such that for all worlds ws, ws  K0 i ws 2 K.
The notion of a dual will be defined to give a way to construct a complement of a
set of composite choices. The idea is that a dual of K contains choices that are incom-
patible with every element of K:
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Definition 4.4. If K is a set of composite choices, then composite choice j0 is a dual of
K with respect to choice space C if 8j 2 K; 9a 2 j; 9a0 2 j0, a 6 a0, 9v 2 C such that
fa; a0g  v. A dual is minimal if no proper subset is also a dual. Let dualsCK be the
set of minimal duals of K with respect to C. (Usually the choice space C is implicit
from the context.)
Example 4.1. Suppose C  ffa; b; cg; fd; e; f gg, then
dualsCffa; dg; fb; egg  ffcg; ff g; fb; dg; fa; egg:
The following lemma shows the relationship between duals and negation. The du-
als of a set K of composite choices is a description of the complementary set of pos-
sible worlds that is described by K:
Lemma 4.3. If K is a set of composite choices, dualsK is a complement of K .
In other words, for every world ws an element of K is true in ws i no element of
dualsK is true in ws. For a proof of this lemma see Appendix A.
There is a strong relationship between the idea of a dual of K and the notion of a
hitting set [27]. Instead of hitting one member of every element of the set, a dual hits
a complement of one of the members of each element of K.
Definition 4.5 [27, Definition 4.3]. Suppose C is a collection of sets. A hitting set for
C is a set H  SS2C S such that H \ S 6 fg for each S 2 C.
Definition 4.6. If a is an atomic choice, the contrary to a with respect to choice space
C, written contCa is vÿ fag where v is the alternative in C which contains a. This is
well defined as a is in a unique alternative. If j is a composite choice, the contrary of
j with respect to choice space C, written contCj, is
S
a2j contCa.
Example 4.2. Consider Example 4.1, where C  ffa; b; cg; fd; e; f gg, then
contCfa; dg  fb; c; e; f g;
contCfb; eg  fa; c; d; f g:
j0 is a dual of K, means that for every element j 2 K, j0 contains an element that is
contrary to one element of j. But this is that same as j0 contains an element of
contCj. Thus we have:
Theorem 4.1. j0 is a dual of K with respect to C iff j0 is a consistent hitting set of
fcontCj : j 2 Kg.
Reiter’s hitting set algorithm [27, Section 4.2] is directly applicable for computing
duals. We can prune any branches in the hitting set tree where the corresponding set
of atomic choices is inconsistent. This is shown in Fig. 1.
Example 4.3. Continuing Example 4.2, the set of consistent minimal hitting sets of
ffb; c; e; f g; fa; c; d; f gg is ffcg; ff g; fb; dg; fa; egg. Although the set fb; ag is a hit-
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ting set it is inconsistent, and so not considered in the set of duals. It is easy to check
that each of the nine worlds is covered by either ffa; dg; fb; egg or
ffcg; ff g; fb; dg; fa; egg, but not both.
4.3. Entailment
Definition 4.7. If a and b are propositions, a entails b with respect to independent
choice framework theory hC;Fi if b is true in all worlds in which a is true.
Example 4.4. If C  ffa; bgg and F  fc a; d  bg then  d entails c and d en-
tails  c. There are two worlds here: one with a; c; b; d true and one with
b; d; a; c true.
Entailment can be contrasted with the consequence relation of a logic program:
Definition 4.8. If a is a composite choice, we write a j b if b is true in the stable
model of F [ a.
If a j b then a entails b. The following example shows how entailment in the
sense of Definition 4.7 is richer than consequence by j , even when the left-side is
a composite choice:
Example 4.5. Suppose C  ffa; bg; fc; dgg and the facts are:
g1  a ^ c:
g1  b ^ c:
c entails g1 but c j= g1. In every world in which c is true, either a is true or b is true,
and so g1 is also true.
We can characterise entailment in terms of a completion of an ICL theory. This
will consist of the completion (in the sense of Clark [5]) of the facts, where we com-
plete all predicates except the atomic choices (similar to [6]). Each alternative gets
Fig. 1. Finding the dual of a set of composite choices K.
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mapped into a formula expressing the exclusivity and covering of the choices in an
alternative.
Definition 4.9. The completion of independent choice framework theory hC;Fi is the
conjunction of
1. Clark’s completion of each predicate that is not an atomic choice.
2. a1 _    _ ak ^
V
i6j  ai ^ aj for each fa1; . . . ; akg 2 C.
3. Clark’s identity theory [5].
The following theorem gives the relationship between entailment and completion.
It should not be too surprising as we are restricting F to be acyclic logic programs,
and the completion of each non-atomic choice is true in every world (only the atomic
choices in each world changes).
Theorem 4.2. a entails b with respect to independent choice framework theory hC;Fi
iff a! b logically follows from the completion of hC;Fi.
For a proof see Appendix A.
Example 4.6. The completion of the ICL theory of Example 4.4 is
c$ a ^ d $ b ^ a _ b^  a ^ b
which is equivalent to
c$ a ^ d $ b ^ a$ b
Aside: The theory in this paper could have been presented in the form of these sen-
tences. Unfortunately, given this representation, the assumption that each total
choice leads to a single possible world is very sensitive to the form of the sentences.
If the language is expanded to much beyond what is the completion of an acyclic ICL
theory, choices in some alternatives would constrain choices that can be made in oth-
er alternatives (some total choices will be inconsistent with the facts) or a total choice
would not completely define a possible world (a total choice together with the facts
may imply a disjunction a _ b without entailing a or b). The formulation in terms of
stable models for acyclic logic programs seems very natural and allows for simple
semantics.
4.4. Explanations
Definition 4.10. If g is a ground propositional formula, an explanation of g is a com-
posite choice that entails g. A minimal explanation is an explanation such that no
subset is an explanation. A covering set of explanations of g is a set of explanations
of g such that one element of the set is true in all worlds in which g is true.
A covering set of explanations of g will be true in exactly the worlds in which g is
true. This will form a concise description of the worlds in which g is true.
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Definition 4.11. If K1 and K2 are sets of composite choices, define the conjunction of
K1 and K2 to be the set of composite choices:
K1 
 K2  fj1 [ j2 : j1 2 K1; j2 2 K2; consistentj1 [ j2g:
It is easy to see that K1 
 K2 defines those worlds where both K1 and K2 are true.
We use the symbol ‘‘
’’ as the conjunction is like the cross product, but where we are
unioning the pairs and removing inconsistent sets.
This operation is used in the following recursive procedure to compute explana-
tions:
Definition 4.12. If G is a ground propositional formula, explG is the set of compos-
ite choices defined recursively as follows:
plG 
minsexplA 
 explB if G  A ^ B;
minsexplA [ explB if G  A _ B;
dualsexplA if G  A;
ffGgg if G 2 [C;
fg if G 2 grF;
minsSi explBi if G 62 [C;G Bi 2 grF;
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
where minsS  fj 2 S : 8j0 2 S; j0 6 jg. duals is defined in Fig. 1. expl is well de-
fined as the theory is acyclic.
Note that the set the explanations of a formula is compositional on the explana-
tions on the atomic formulae that make up the formula. In particular, the explana-
tions of  A are computed from the explanations of A, and the explanations of A ^ B
are derived from the explanations of A and the explanations of B.
expl can be used directly as a recursive procedure to compute explanations, either
top-down or bottom-up. The following theorem establishes the correctness of the
expl procedure:
Theorem 4.3. Ground formula g is true in world ws iff there is some j 2 explg such
that j  Rs. Moreover explg is a finite set of finite sets.
For a proof see Appendix A.
Corollary 4.1. explG is a covering set of explanations of G.
Note that explG is not necessarily the set of minimal explanations, as the follow-
ing example shows.
Example 4.7. Suppose C  ffa; bg; fc; dg; fe; f gg and the facts are:
g1  a ^ c:
g1  b ^ c:
g2  a ^ c:
g2  b ^ e:
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In this case explg1  ffa; cg; fb; cgg. There is one minimal explanation for g1,
namely fcg.
Also explg2  ffa; cg; fb; egg, but the set of minimal explanations of g2 is
ffa; cg; fb; eg; fc; egg. fc; eg is an explanation, because if c and e were true, whichev-
er of a or b were true in a possible worlds would make g2 true in that possible world
This shows that the set of minimal explanations of a goal is not necessarily a min-
imal covering set of explanations. This idea should be compared to the idea of kernel
diagnoses and an irredundant set of kernel diagnoses [8].
The set of minimal diagnoses can be computed using a notion of generalised res-
olution of explanations:
Definition 4.13. If v  fa1; . . . ; akg 2 C, and fL1; . . . ; Lkg is a set of explanations of g
such that ai 2 Li for each i 2 f1; . . . ; kg, the generalised resolution of the explanations
fL1; . . . ; Lkg with respect to alternative v is L1 [    [ Lk ÿ fa1; . . . ; akg.
Fig. 2 gives an algorithm to repeatedly resolve clauses with respect to alternatives
in the choice space and remove redundant clauses. It is similar to the use of binary
resolution to compute the prime implicates of a set of clauses [13].
Lemma 4.4. The set of all minimal explanations of g is the set K resulting from termi-
nation of the algorithm of Fig. 2.
For a proof of this lemma see Appendix A.
Example 4.8. Consider the ICL theory of Example 4.7.
To find the minimal explanations of g1 we start o with K  explg1 
ffa; cg; fb; cgg. As fa; bg 2 C, we can resolve fa; cg and fb; cg resulting in fcg.
minsK [ ffcgg  minsffa; cg; fb; cg; fcgg  ffcgg.
To find the minimal explanations of g2 we start o with K  explg2
 ffa; cg; fb; egg. As fa; bg 2 C, we can resolve fa; cg and fb; eg resulting in fc; eg.
minsK [ ffc; egg  minsffa; cg; fb; cg; fc; egg  ffa; cg; fb; cg; fc; egg. No more
resolutions can be carried out, and the procedure stops.
4.5. Splitting composite choices
The final operation on (sets of) composite choices is splitting a composite choice
into a number of composite choices. This will be used to make sets of mutually in-
Fig. 2. Finding all minimal explanations of g.
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compatible composite choices. This will be used for using explanations to compute
probabilities (Section 5), but can be used whenever we do not want redundant
proofs. Recall that we are assuming that each alternative is finite.
Definition 4.14. If v  fa1; . . . ; akg is an alternative and j is a composite choice such
that j \ v  fg, the split of j on v is the set of composite choices
fj [ fa1g; . . . ; j [ fakgg:
It is easy to see that j and a split of j describe the same set of possible worlds:
Lemma 4.5. If ws is a possible world, ws  j iff there is some ai 2 v such that
ws  j [ faig.
If there is a finite number of alternatives, starting from set K of composite choices,
repeated splitting of composite choices can produce the set of total choices (and so
possible worlds) in which K is true. Such an operation is not, however, of much use.
The main use for splitting is, given a set of composite choices to construct a set of
mutually incompatible composite choices that describes the same set of possible
worlds as the original set. Suppose K is a set of composite choices, there are two op-
erations we consider to form a new set K0 of composite choices:
1. Removing dominated elements: if j1; j2 2 K and j1  j2, let K0  Kÿ fj2g.
2. Splitting elements: if j1; j2 2 K, such that j1 [ j2 is consistent (and neither is a su-
perset of the other), there is a a 2 j1 ÿ j2 and v 2 C such that a 2 v. We replace j2
by the split of j2 on v. Let K2 be the split of j2 on v, and K
0  Kÿ fj2g [ K2.
It is easy to see that K and K0 describe the same set of possible worlds.
If we repeat the above two operations until neither is applicable, the procedure
stops (if K is a finite set of finite composite choices) and we end up with a set of mu-
tually incompatible composite choices that is equivalent to the original set (is true in
the same set of possible worlds).This procedure is depicted in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Make set of composite choices K mutually incompatible.
D. Poole / J. Logic Programming 44 (2000) 5–35 17
Example 4.9. Suppose
C  ffa1; a2; a3g; fb1; b2; b3g; fc1; c2; c3gg;
K  ffa1; b1g; fa1; c1gg:
The elements of K are not mutually incompatible (there is a world in which they are
both true – namely the world with total choice fa1; b1; c1g). We can split the second
element of K on fb1; b2; b3g, resulting in
K0  ffa1; b1g; fa1; b1; c1g; fa1; b2; c1g; fa1; b3; c1gg:
The second element can be removed, and we end up with
K00  ffa1; b1g; fa1; b2; c1g; fa1; b3; c1gg;
which is a mutually incompatible set of composite choices equivalent to K.
It is possible, even with only two composite choices that we will need to spilt mul-
tiple times, as the following example shows:
Example 4.10. Suppose
C  ffa1; a2g; fb1; b2g; fc1; c2g; fd1; d2g; fe1; e2g; ff1; f2g; fg1; g2gg;
K  ffa1; b1; c1g; fa1; d1; e1; f1gg:
We can split the second element of K on fb1; b2g resulting in
K0  ffa1; b1; c1g; fa1; b1; d1; e1; f1g; fa1; b2; d1; e1; f1gg:
We can split the second element of K0 on fc1; c2g resulting in
K00  ffa1; b1; c1g; fa1; b1; c1; d1; e1; f1g; fa1; b1; c2; d1; e1; f1g; fa1; b2; d1; e1; f1gg:
The second element of K00 is subsumed, so we can remove it, resulting in
K000  ffa1; b1; c1g; fa1; b1; c2; d1; e1; f1g; fa1; b2; d1; e1; f1gg;
which is a mutually incompatible set of composite choices equivalent to K.
A few interesting complexity questions about the procedure of Fig. 3 can be an-
swered:
1. How many splits may be needed?
2. How many composite choices are in the resulting set of mutually incompatible
composite choices?
3. Is there a heuristic that tells us on which element we should split? In the second
operation we can split on j1 or on j2; does one result in fewer composite choices?
The first thing to notice is that to make a set of composite choices mutually in-
compatible, it may be the case that we have to consider each pair of composite choic-
es. Given a pair of composite choices we can analyze exactly the number of splits and
the number of resultant composite choices.
Suppose we are trying to make composite choices j1 and j2 incompatible. Let K2
be the split of j2 on v (where j1 contains an element of v). We must have K2j j  vj j.
All but one of the elements of K2 are incompatible with j1 (thus there are vj j ÿ 1 of
these composite choices incompatible with j1). Let j3 be the element of K2 compat-
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ible with j1 (j3 will be j1 \ v [ j2). Either j1 is a subset of j3 (this occurs i
jj1 ÿ j2j  1), or we have have to repeat the loop to make j1 and j3 incompatible.
Suppose j1 ÿ j2  fa1; . . . ; akg, where ai 2 vi. Either we are going to eventually
split j2 on v1; . . . ; vk, or else we are going to have to split j1 on the analogous set,
in order to make the resultant set of composite choices mutually incompatible. It
makes no sense to split both j1 and j2 in order to make them incompatible. If we
repeatedly split j2 on the vi we will need k  jj1 ÿ j2j splits. The resulting set of com-
posite choices will contain Pki1 jvij ÿ k ÿ 1 elements.
Thus if all of the alternatives have the same length, to minimise the number of
composite choices in the mutually incompatible set we should repeatedly split the
larger of a pair of composite choices.
4.6. An example in detail
Continuing Example 1.1, suppose we also have that the agent often drops the key
if it is slippery and if the key is not slippery, it sometimes fumbles and drops the key:
dropskey; T   
slipperykey; T ^
drop slippery keyT :
dropskey; T   
 slipperykey; T ^
fumbles keyT :
Suppose that, independently at each time, the agent either drops or holds a slippery
key and either fumbles or retains an unslippery key. This is specified by:
8T fdrop slippery keyT ; holds slippery keyT g 2 C
8T ffumbles keyT ; retains keyT g 2 C
Suppose that the key could start slippery and subsequently become unslippery. (We
could model the key becoming slippery by adding an extra clause, but this makes the
example more complicated.)
slipperykey; sT   
slipperykey; T ^
stays slipperyT :
slipperykey; 0  
initially slipperykey:
Whether the key remains slippery at each step and whether it is initially slippery are
both choices:
8T fstays slipperyT ; stops being slipperyT g 2 C
8T finitially slipperykey; initially unslipperykeyg 2 C
We can axiomatise the location of the robot and the key in a similar manner. The
robot, goes to the location of the action if the move was successful, otherwise it stays
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still. The key stays where it is unless it is being carried in which case it is at the
location of the robot.
atrobot; Pos; sT   
dogotoPos; T ^
goto succeedsT :
atrobot; Pos1; sT   
dogotoPos; T ^
atrobot; Pos1; T ^
 goto succeedsT :
atrobot; Pos; sT   
 goto actionT ^
atrobot; Pos; T :
atkey; Pos; T   
carryingkey; T ^
atrobot; Pos; T :
atkey; Pos; sT   
 carryingkey; sT ^
atkey; Pos; T :
There is only one goto action.6
goto actionT   
dogotoPos; T :
The goto action either succeeds or fails at each time.
8T fgoto succeedsT ; goto failsT g 2 C:






Example 4.11. There is one explanation for slipperykey; ss0:
stays slipperys0; stays slippery0; initially slipperykey
Example 4.12. The explanation for slipperykey; ss0 has three duals:
6 This is needed as we do not have explicit quantification, and all variables are universally quantified
outside the scope of the clause. Existentially quantified variables in the scope of a negation can be handled
by introducing a new clause.




These thus form the explanations for  slipperykey; ss0. These can be made
disjoint giving the explanations:
initially slipperykey; stays slippery0; stops being slipperys0
initially slipperykey; stops being slippery0
initially unslipperykey
Example 4.13. Consider the explanations for dropskey; ss0. The first clause for
drops results in one explanation:
drop slippery keyss0; stays slipperys0; stays slippery0;
initially slipperykey
The second clause for drops results in three more explanations for dropskey; ss0,
namely:
fumbles keyss0; initially slipperykey; stays slippery0;
stops being slipperys0
fumbles keyss0; initially slipperykey; stops being slippery0
fumbles keyss0; initially unslipperykey
Example 4.14. There are four explanations for  dropskey; ss0:
initially slipperykey; stays slippery0; retains keyss0;
stops being slipperys0
initially slipperykey; retains keyss0; stops being slippery0
retains keyss0; initially unslipperykey
initially slipperykey; stays slippery0; stays slipperys0;
holds slippery keyss0
Example 4.15. Consider explaining carryingkey; sss0. Using the second clause
for carrying, we need to combine these four explanations for  dropskey; ss0
with explanations for carryingkey; ss0.There are four explanations of
carryingkey; sss0:
initially slipperykey; stays slippery0; retains keyss0;
stops being slipperys0; pickup succeedss0; goto succeeds0
initially slipperykey; retains keyss0; stops being slippery0;
pickup succeedss0; goto succeeds0
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retains keyss0; initially unslipperykey; pickup succeedss0;
goto succeeds0
initially slipperykey; stays slippery0; stays slipperys0;
holds slippery keyss0; pickup succeedss0; goto succeeds0
Example 4.16. From the above explanations of carryingkey; sss0, we can de-
rive explanations for  carryingkey; sss0, three of which are:
goto fails0
goto succeeds0; pickup failss0
goto succeeds0; pickup succeedss0; drop slippery keyss0;
initially slipperykey; stays slippery0; stays slipperys0
There are six other explanations.
What is important to notice about these examples is that we can write declarative
clauses defining the dynamics of the world, forgetting about the fact that some of the
conditions will be uncertain. The explanations of a ground formula are a description
of exactly those worlds in which it is true. The mutual incompatibility means that
each world is only described by one explanation.
5. Probabilities
In many applications we would like to assign a probability over the alternatives
[19,22]. This lets us use the logic programming representation for standard Bayesian
reasoning. The rule structure mirrors the independence of Bayesian networks, and
provides a form of contextual independence that can be exploited in probabilistic in-
ference [23].
Suppose we are given a function P0 from atomic choices into 0; 1 such thatP
a2v P0a  1 for all alternatives v 2 C. That is, P0 is a probability distribution
on each alternative. We assume that the alternatives are unconditionally probabilis-
tically independent.
Intuitively, we would like the probability measure of any world to be the product
of the probabilities of the atomic choices that make up the total choice defining the
world. That is, lws 
Q
a2Rs P0a. The probability of any proposition is the sum
of the probabilities of the worlds in which proposition is true. That is,
P a Pwsa lws. This only works when the choice space is finite. However, when
the alternatives are parametrized and there are function symbols (as in Section 4.6),
there are infinitely many possible worlds, each with measure zero, and we need a
more sophisticated construct. The general idea is to define a measure over sets of
possible worlds.
Let WhC;Fi  fws : s is a selector function on Cg. Thus WhC;Fi is the set of all pos-
sible worlds. We define the algebra of subsets of WhC;Fi that can be described by finite
sets of finite composite choices.
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XhC;Fi  fx  WhC;Fi : 9 finite set of finite composite choices K
such that 8w; w 2 x iff w  Kg;
XhC;Fi is closed under finite unions and complementation. That is, if x1;x2 2 XhC;Fi
then x1 [ x2 2 XhC;Fi and WhC;Fi ÿ x1 2 XhC;Fi.
As shown in Section 4.5, every set of composite choices is equivalent to a mutually
incompatible set of composite choices. Thus, for every x 2 XhC;Fi, there exists a mu-
tually incompatible set of composite choices K such that w 2 x iff w  K.
Lemma 5.1. If K and K 0 are both mutually incompatible sets of composite choices such







This lemma is the same as Lemma A.8 in Ref. [19].







where K is a mutually incompatible set of composite choices such that
w 2 x iff w  K. Lemma 5.1 implies that it does not matter which K is chosen.
Lemma 5.2. l satisfies the axioms of probability,7 namely:
• lx  1ÿ lx where x is the complement of x and,
• if x1 and x2 are disjoint sets, lx1 [ x2  lx1  lx2.
We can now define the probability of ground formula g by P g  lfw : w  gg.
This is well defined as for any g, by the acyclicity of the facts, there is a finite covering
set of finite explanations of g. That is, fw : w  gg 2 XhC;Fi. In particular, we have the
following:








We can define a conditional probability in the normal manner: If P b 6 1,
Pajb def P a ^ bP b :
From this we can see that Bayesian conditioning corresponds to abduction. When
we observe b and condition on it, this means that we find the explanations for it.
Section 4.4 shows how to construct a set of covering explanations of g. The prob-
lem is to generate a covering and mutually incompatible set of explanations of g.
There are three approaches than can be used:
7 Note that we do not require r-additivity (the sum rule for infinite disjuncts) as, by acyclicity, each
ground formula has a finite set of finite explanations.
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1. Build the fact base to guarantee that only mutually incompatible explanations are
returned by explg.
2. Construct a covering and mutually incompatible set of explanations from a cov-
ering set of explanations.
3. Compute the probabilities directly from the set of explanations generated by
explg.
These are discussed in the next three sections.
5.1. Disjointed rule bases
Poole [19] shows the relationship to abduction in the acyclic definite clause case
(without negation as failure) under the constraint that the bodies of the ground in-
stances of the rules for any atom are incompatible. That is, if a b1 and a b2 are
two ground instances of rules for a, there is no possible world in which b1 and b2 is
true. Under this restriction, the probability of g can be obtained by adding the prob-
abilities of the explanations of g [19]. In this section we extend this idea to the more
general rule formulation given in this paper.
Definition 5.1. A rule base F is disjointed if
• for every pair of dierent rules h1  b1 and h2  b2 in F and for every pair of
grounding substitutions h1 and h2, if h1h1  h2h2, there is no world in which
b1h1 ^ b2h2 is true;
• for every rule h b in F and for every pair of grounding substitutions h1 and h2
such that hh1  hh2 and bh1 6 bh2, there is no world in which bh1 ^ bh2 is true, and
• whenever b1 _ b2 appears in the body of any ground rule, there is no world in
which any ground instance of b1 ^ b2 is true.
Suppose we have a disjointed knowledge base. We can use a variant of expl to
compute a mutually incompatible and covering set of explanations of g. In particu-
lar, none of the mins functions are needed (no subset of an explanation will ever be
generated as an explanation). The only time that mutually incompatible composite
choices can be generated is in computing duals (Section 4.2). We can make these dis-
joint using the algorithm of Fig. 3. This is summarised in algorithm expld :
pldG 
fg if G  true;
expldA 
 expldB if G  A ^ B;
expldA [ expldB if G  A _ B;
disjointdualsexpldA if G  A;
ffGgg if G 2 [C;S
i expldBi if G 62 [C;G Bi 2 grF:
8>>>><
>>>>>:
Proposition 5.2. If F is a disjointed rule base, expldg will always return a minimal
mutually incompatible and covering set of explanations of g.
The coveringness is a direct consequence of Theorem 4.3. The mutually incompat-
ibility is due to the disjointedness of the rule base; 
 preserves the mutual incompat-
ibility, and union is only used on pairwise incompatible sets. The minimality is a
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consequence of the mutually incompatibility – a subset is compatible with its super-
set if the superset is consistent.
Note that the term minimal here means that the set of explanations is minimal; i.e.,
no subset also has this property. It does not mean that the explanations are minimal.
This idea of exploiting properties of rules to gain eciency is a powerful and gen-
eral idea. From experience, it seems that obeying the discipline of writing disjointed
rule sets helps to debug knowledge bases and to write clearer and more concise
knowledge bases.
5.2. Making explanations mutually incompatible
Given a covering set of explanations of g, as produced, for example by the use of
expl, we can use the repeated splitting algorithm of Section 4.5 to create a covering
and mutually incompatible set of explanations of g.
5.3. Computing probabilities from arbitrary sets of composite choices
We do not need to create a mutually incompatible set of explanations. Probabil-
ities can be computed from an arbitrary covering set of explanations. The general
idea is when adding probabilities of disjunctions we have to subtract the part we
have double counted.
The following formula is true whether or not j1 and j2 are incompatible.
Pj1 _ j2  Pj1  P j2 ÿ Pj1 ^ j2:
The general case is more complicated. If we have fj1; . . . ; jng as a covering set of
explanations of g, we can use the following formula to compute the probability of g:





16 i1<<ij 6 n
ÿ1j1P ji1 ^    ^ jij:
The second sum is summing over all subsets of fj1; . . . ;jng that contain exactly j
elements.




The main problem with this sum is that we are summing 2n ÿ 1 probabilities,
where n is the number of explanations of g. This can often be reduced as we do
not need to consider any supersets of an inconsistent composite choice.
6. Combinatorics
In this section we explore how much the abductive view can save over the model
theoretic view, and provide some answers to the question: how much smaller will a
set of covering explanations be than the set of possible worlds? This is important as
it is the set of these covering explanations that we need to sum over to determine
probabilities.
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In the general case with infinitely many finite alternatives, there are infinitely
many possible worlds, but any ground atom always has a finite set of covering expla-
nations, each of which is finite. This is guaranteed by the acyclicity of the rule base.
When there are finitely many finite alternatives, there are examples where there
are the same number of covering explanations of some g as there are worlds in which
g is true. This occurs when (and only when) the explanations are total choices.
It is interesting to consider the case where the ICL theory is the result of trans-
forming a Bayesian network as in Ref. [19]. Although any probabilistic dependence
can be modelled with independent choices (hypotheses) in the ICL, this is done at the
cost of greatly increasing the number of worlds. However, as we see below, the ab-
ductive characterisation can be used to (often more than) counteract this combina-
torial explosion.
Suppose there are n (binary) random variables that we want to model, and there
are no independencies that we can exploit. The Bayesian network [17] representation
for this is a complete graph. There are 2n ÿ 1 independent numbers that can be as-
signed to specify the joint distribution (we can assign a non-negative real number to
each of the 2n worlds, but this is over constrained by one number – we need to divide
by the sum in order to get a probability). In order to model this with independent
choices, we have 2n ÿ 1 binary alternatives. This is exactly the number of alternatives
(or disjoint declarations in the terminology of Ref. [19]) created in the translation of
the Bayesian network into a probabilistic Horn abduction theory [19]. This, however
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nÿ1 possible worlds in the independent choice logic. This combinatorial ar-
gument would seem to indicate that the modelling by independent choices can be ru-
led out on combinatorial grounds.
However, consider the size of the minimal explanations of any proposition. Each
minimal explanation has at most n assumptions; they at most assign one value to
each of the original propositions. At the extreme, for the root variable (with nÿ 1
parents), there are 2nÿ1 rules, each with its own alternative. Only one of these rules
and only one of the atomic choices will be in any minimal explanation, as there will
only be one assignment of values to the parents of that node implied by the expla-
nation. There will be at most 2n explanations. For this case there are thus logarith-
mically fewer explanations than there are possible worlds – the abductive
characterisation makes the combinatorics of the independent choice the same as
for the general case with arbitrary dependencies amongst the hypotheses (exactly
the same number of numbers have to be assigned as well).
The abductive characterization is interesting because:
1. We can exploit independencies amongst variables in the same way as Bayesian
networks [19].
2. We only need to consider the ancestors in the Bayesian network of what we are
trying to find the explanations of, and not the set of all valuations of the Bayesian
network (although such pruning can also be done in the Bayesian network [2]).
3. Where there are contextual independencies (some variable may only depend on
another variable when a third variable has a particular value), the abductive char-
acterisation naturally exploits these independencies. Such contextual indepen-
dence have been exploited in dynamic programming [3,21] and probabilistic
inference [22] – instead of considering the state space, as dynamic programming
traditionally does, we can consider just the explanations of a proposition we were
interested in (e.g., the dierent values of the utility).
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7. Beyond acyclic logic programs
We chose acyclic logic programs [1] as the base logic as there is a unique stable
model for any acyclic logic program. This is important in properly defining truth
in possible worlds (Definition 3.3). The property that we want for our logic programs
is that each total choice leads to a single model. This means two things:
1. Each selection of an element from each alternative is consistent. This means that
the logic cannot allow a selection of choices from some alternatives to impose any
restrictions on choices from other alternatives. This, for example, disallows the
logic from being the arbitrary predicate calculus, Horn clauses with integrity con-
straints [14], or logic programs under the stable model semantics with no stable
models (such as a  a).
2. Each total choice cannot be extended into more than one possible world. This ex-
cludes us from having explicit disjunction in our logic. It also means, for example,
that we cannot have logic programs under the stable models semantics with more
than one stable model (such as a  b; b  a which has two stable models, one
with a true and one with b true). We are also excluding three-valued models of
logic programs [26] from consideration, as we cannot give a probabilistic interpr-
etation to them.
Acyclic logic programs were chosen because they guarantee the uniqueness of the
model for each total choice. The acyclic condition is, however, too strong. One way
to weaken the condition is by the use of what we call contingently acyclic logic pro-
grams.
One thing that cannot be expressed in an acyclic logic program is to give a relation
a default value:
Example 7.1. Suppose rO; V  is a relation between object O and value V. To state
that there is a default value d (i.e., objects should have value d unless they have been
given another value), we can use the logic program:
rO; d   has another r valueO
has another r valueO  rO; V  ^ V 6 d
This is not acyclic as there is no way to assign the natural numbers so that
ro; d > has another r valueo
has another r valueo > ro; d
But this second constraint seems to be superfluous, as it only applied to a rule whose
body is always false (as it has d 6 d) in the body.
Example 7.2. Suppose we have the knowledge base:
aboveX ; Y   onX ; Z ^ aboveZ; Y :
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This knowledge base is not acyclic as the first rule has the acyclic constraint that
abovea; b > abovea; b, which cannot be true. This relation however relies on an
instance of the rule with onX ;X , but there is no instance of this atom that is true.
Given the database for on, the only instances of the first rule that do not immediately
fail, are those for which onX ; Z unify with one of the clauses. If we only consider
these instances, we can assign a natural number to make these acyclic. If we were to
add ond; a to the knowledge base, there is a cycle.
We define contingently acyclic programs to exclude from grF  those rules whose
body is always false.
Definition 7.1. Given a set of clauses, we say a ground atom is immediately false if it
does not resolve with the head of any clause or, when we have semantic constraints
(due to built-in relations like equality), if the atom is false due to the semantic con-
straints (e.g., d 6 d). If G is a set of ground clauses define
redundantG  fH  B 2 G : one conjunct in B is immediately falseg:
A logic program F is contingently acyclic if grF  ÿ redundantgrF  is acyclic.
This means that the rule bases of Examples 7.1 and 7.2 above are contingently
acyclic. It is called contingently acyclic as the instances of the rules happen to be
acyclic based on the existence of other clauses and semantic constraints.
Corollary 7.1. The equivalences of Theorem 2.1 hold for contingently acyclic pro-
grams.
This is true as the semantics of a logic program, and the completion formula are
completely determined by the the ground instances. Removing the rules with always
false bodies does not change any of the semantics referred to in Theorem 2.1.
The following lemma says that we can use the acyclic logic program results for our
semantics if F is acyclic (as Rs imposes no constraints on the acyclicity).
Lemma 7.1. If F is a (contingently) acyclic logic program, and s is a selector function,
then F [ Rs is a (contingently) acyclic logic program.
One could imagine that the idea behind contingently acyclic logic programs could
be extended to remove instances that would never be generated at all by forward
chaining (contingently acyclic logic programs remove all of those instances that
provably cannot be generated by forward chaining one step). In Definition 7.1, once
a redundant set of clauses is removed, there may be more immediately false ground
atoms, that can in turn make more redundant clauses. However, which clause is re-
dundant depends on the total choice:
Example 7.3. Consider a logic program, that contains the rules
a c ^ b
b  c ^ a
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but is otherwise acyclic where the assignment of numbers is such that c is assigned a
lower number than both a and b. There is still a unique model for each total choice,
as each total choice, together with the facts, entail either c or  c. Which it entails
may depend on the total choice.
Extending the definition to cover such cases would not cover the class of all pro-
grams with a unique model for each total choice, as the following example shows:
Example 7.4. Here is an example, which is not contingently acyclic:
F  fsomeonewins intN ^ winsN;
int0;
intsN  intNg
C  ffwinsN; losesNg : N is a termg:
This has the property of a unique model for each selection, but is not acyclic because
someonewins has to be assigned a number bigger than any integer. This program can
be interpreted according to our semantics given in Section 3; there are 2@0 possible
worlds, where someonewins is true in all but one of them. When we consider this
probabilistically, unless there are only finitely many alternatives with a non-zero
probability of a win, the world where someonewins is false has measure zero.
One could think of extending the notion of (contingently) acyclic programs to in-
clude, for example, limit ordinals, but whether this would either cover all of the nat-
urally occurring cases or be needed for real applications is still an open question.
The motivation for restricting to acyclic programs was to ensure there was a un-
ique model for each total choice. Other uses for acyclic logic programs are the ability
to prove termination [16]. These are related, and it is interesting to note that the ter-
minating programs of Marchiori [16] result in unique models, but the converse is not
true. One complication is that we do not want to have to, for each total choice, prove
there is a unique model, as there can be infinitely many total choices.
8. Comparison with other formalisms
8.1. Propositional satisfiability
When the alternatives are binary, the operations on sets of composite choices cor-
respond to operations on DNF formulae. The main point of this paper, is to show
how the composite choices interact with the rules that include negation as failure.
Consider a binary alternative fa; bg. In any world where a is selected, b is false. In
any world where b is selected, a is false. Thus b  a. Whenever b appears in the
facts it can be replaced by  a, without aecting what is entailed by the theory.
We could even thing of this alternative as fa; ag.
For the binary case, a composite choice corresponds to a consistent conjunction
of literals. A set of composite choices corresponds to a DNF formula made up of
literals of atomic choices. The dual operation corresponds to negating the DNF
and converting the result to DNF. The operation 
 (Definition 4.11) corresponds
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to conjoining the DNF formulae and distributing back into DNF. The algorithm of
Fig. 2 corresponds to the use of binary resolution to compute the prime implicates of
a set of clauses [13].
Davydov and Davydova [7] have extended the above Boolean logic notions to al-
low more that one element in each alternative (as in this paper). Their notion of a
dual corresponds to the hitting set in this paper. They have provided an algebra
of operations on these dual structures. Their work is orthogonal to the work in this
paper. What is important about this paper is how the sets of composite choices in-
teract with the rules. If we consider the constraints on the DNF formulae, then we
realise that any composite choices is consistent with the facts; the facts by themselves
impose no constraints on the composite choices. The constraints on the composite
choices is provided by the interaction between the facts and the observations. Thus
this paper is presenting a particular way to provide such constraints (one that corre-
sponds to Bayesian conditioning). Based on this interaction, we have presented an
abductive characterization of the logic. We have provided a limited set of operations
on these dual structures that are applicable for evidential reasoning. Davydov and
Davydova used the dual structures for optimization, where they want to select the
best total choice rather based on an evaluation function, rather than the evidential
reasoning task of this paper, where we want to sum the measures of the consistent
total choices. For decision problems [22], we want to both sum over choices by na-
ture and optimize over choices by the decision making agent. The combination of
these techniques is an intriguing possibility, but beyond the scope of this paper.
8.2. Abductive logic programming
The combination of abduction and logic programming has a long history (see Ka-
kas et al. [12] for a good survey). The combination proposed in this paper is quite
dierent from other proposals mainly because the abductive characterisation is a
consequence of an independently defined semantics. The normal definition of stable
models [10] is used to define negation as failure – there is no alternative notion of
negation as failure that needs to be defined and motivated. There is a much closer
tie between negation as failure used in this paper and so-called ‘‘real’’ negation;
 a is true in a world if and only if a is not true in the world.
In abductive logic programming, the minimality of explanations has a semantic
significance; if E is an explanation for some g, it does not imply that E [ fag, even
if internally consistent, is an explanation. However, in the ICL, any consistent super-
set of an explanation is an explanation: if E is an explanation for g, and a is an atom-
ic choice that is consistent with E, then E [ fag is an explanation for g.
One of the things unique about the work reported in this paper is that the expla-
nations of  g are a function of the explanations of g. In other frameworks for ab-
ductive logic programming, if there is an explanation for g, and negation was not
used to prove g, there are no explanations for  g (all explanations of  g are ob-
tained from negation as failure used to prove g).
The main semantic dierence is that we interpret failure-to-prove in each world,
rather than failure given the whole theory. This means that equivalences that are true
for each world, such as Clark’s completion for nonassumables, hold for the whole
theory. Rather than forcing this meaning, it is a natural consequence of the frame-
work.
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Much of the power comes from having a structured hypothesis space. It is this
structure that allows us to give such a clean semantics, upon which it is easy to im-
pose a probability measure (Section 5), and upon which it is easy to extend to mul-
tiple agents making choices [22].
The use of a rule base that is a complete definition, even if all of the elements of
the body of rules are not completely defined, is similar to the completion of non-ab-
ducible predicates in the completion semantics for abduction [6,20], but these do not
allow for negation as failure. It is also similar to the motivation for OLP-FOL [9],
but in the ICL the aim is to handle all uncertainty in terms of Bayesian decision the-
ory (or game theory when there is more than one agent) [22,24], as opposed to han-
dling uncertainty in the non-defined predicates using first order logic (as is done in
OLP-FOL). Note that OLP-FOL takes a dierent approach to badly defined pred-
icates (such as p in p   p). Whereas, Denecker is quite happy to have a three-val-
ued semantics for these predicates (but not for predicates defined in the FOL), we do
not allow these because we want to have a normal probabilistic semantics. Rather
than allowing a three-valued semantics, we restrict the language to be acyclic to en-
sure we do not have such badly defined predicates. It also seems that writing acyclic
programs is good programming practice; a cyclic program usually indicates a bug.
8.3. Probabilistic Horn abduction
Probabilistic Horn abduction [18,19] is a pragmatic framework for combining log-
ic and probability with independent hypotheses and definite clauses giving the con-
sequences of the hypotheses. There is a close relationship between Bayesian networks
[17] and probabilistic Horn abduction [19].
The independent choice logic extends the logical part of probabilistic Horn abduc-
tion in allowing for negation as failure in the body of rules, and in allowing for non-
disjoint rules. The modelling language is thus much expanded without losing seman-
tic simplicity or elegance. A complementary paper [22] considers allowing dierent
agents to choose assumptions, and explores the relationship to notions in game the-
ory and stochastic dynamical systems. That paper uses only the model-theoretic se-
mantics and not the abductive characterization explored here.
9. Conclusion
This paper has presented a mix of abduction and logic programming (including
negation as failure) that allows for a clean mix of logic programming and probabil-
ity. This was defined in terms of a semantic framework that allows for the indepen-
dent choices. This framework allows us to import directly the stable models
semantics for our logic programs (or any other semantics that is definitive on total
choices). The abductive characterisation is a consequence of the semantics – the
set of explanations of a formula is a concise description of the worlds in which
the formula is true. The result of this is a clean and useful mix of abduction, logic
programming and probabilistic reasoning.
This has been implemented and used for applications in decision theory [22,24].
The code is available from my web site (http://www.cs.ubc.ca/spider/poole).
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Appendix A. Proofs
Lemma 4.3. If K is a set of composite choices, dualsK is a complement of K.
Proof. Let ws be a world. To prove: an element of K is true in ws i no element of
dualsK is true in ws. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: There is an element j 2 K that is true in ws. To show there is no element of
dualsK that is true in ws. If j0 2 dualsK then, by definition of duals, there is an
a 2 j and a0 2 j0 such that fa; a0g  A 2 C. As j is true in ws, a must be true in
ws (i.e., s selects a from A). So a0 is false in ws. So j0 is false in ws.
Case 2: There is no element of K that is true in ws. This means that for every el-
ement j 2 K, there is an element a 2 j such that s does not select a (and instead se-
lects some a0). Let j00 be the range of selector function s. Then j00 satisfies all of the
conditions for membership in dualsK except perhaps minimality. Then there is
some subset j0 of j00 that is minimal and so in dualsK. j0 is true in ws. So there
is an element of dualsK that is true in ws. 
Theorem 4.2. a entails b with respect to independent choice framework theory hC;Fi iff
a! b logically follows from the completion of hC;Fi.
Proof. If M is a model of the completion of hC;Fi, then one element of each alter-
native is true in M, as for each alternative fa1; . . . ; akg 2 C, the completion contains
the formula a1 _    _ ak ^
V
i6j  ai ^ aj. Each of these selections is consistent
with Clark’s completion (as we only completed the predicates that were not atomic
choices). Thus eachM is a model of a total choice, and each total choice has a model
M. The total choice together with Clark’s completion has a unique stable model, as
the theory is acyclic [1].
a entails b with respect to independent choice framework theory hC;Fi means b is
true in all possible worlds in which a is true. This is that same as for all total choices
a! b is true in the stable models of the total choice together with F, which is true i
for all total choices a! b logically follows from the total choice together with
Clark’s completion of F [1], which is equivalent to a! b logically follows from
the completion of hC;Fi. 
Theorem 4.3. Ground formula g is true in world ws iff there is some j 2 explg such
that j  Rs. Moreover explg is a finite set of finite sets.
Proof. The proof is by induction on structure of the formula and on the the level as-
signed by the acyclicity of F. Acyclicity is needed to make sure the inductive proofs
ground out.
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Base case: The base case for the induction is unstructured formulae (atoms) that
are minimal in the acyclicity ordering. These are atomic choices and atomic facts.
The theorem is trivially true for the atomic facts, where j  fg.
Suppose a is an atomic choice. a is true in ws i a 2 Rs. expla  ffagg thus
j  fag, and j  Rs is the same as a 2 Rs.
Structural induction: Suppose g is a structured formula, and that the theorem
is true for every substructure for g, to show it is true for g. g is either of the
form f ^ h, f _ h or  f where f and h are formulae (for which the theorem
holds).
Suppose g is of the form f ^ h. g is true in world ws i both f and h are true in ws.
• Suppose g is true in world ws, thus f and h are true in ws, then by the induction
there is a j1 2 explf  such that j1  Rs and a j2 2 explh such that
j2  Rs. Then consistentj1 [ j2 (as they are both true in ws), as so
j1 [ j2 2 explg (or a subset of j1 [ j2 is in explg), and j1 [ j2  Rs.
• Suppose g is false in world ws, then one of f or h is false in ws. Suppose (without
loss of generality) that f is false in ws. By the induction argument, there is no
j 2 explf  such that j  Rs, and as every element of explg is a superset of
the elements of explf , there is no j 2 explg such that j  Rs.
The proof when g is of the form f _ h is similar.
Suppose g is of the form  f . g is true in ws i f is false in ws i there is no element
j 2 explf  such that j  Rs (by the inductive assumption) which holds if and only
if there is some j0 2 dualsexplf  such that j0  Rs (by Theorem 4.3), but then
j0 2 explg.
Acyclicity ordering induction Finally suppose g is a ground atom, and the theo-
rem holds for all atoms lower in the acyclicity ordering, and for all structured formu-
lae build from atoms lower in the acyclicity ordering. Suppose fg  big is the set of
all ground instances of rules in grF with g as the head. g is true in ws i some bi is
true in ws which (by the inductive assumption) holds i there is some j 2 explbi
such that j  Rs. But then j 2 explg or a subset of j is in explg; in either case
the theorem follows. 
Lemma 4.4. The set of all minimal explanations of g is the set K resulting from termi-
nation of the algorithm of Fig. 2.
Proof. It is easy to see that only explanations are in K. Moreover, if all of the min-
imal explanations are in K then because of the use of mins, there will be no non-min-
imal explanations in K. The only thing remaining to show is that if j is a minimal
explanation of g, then it is in K.
The proof of this will mirror proofs of the completeness of binary resolution, with
the splitting tree playing the part of the semantic tree (see, for example, Ref. [4]).
A splitting tree is a tree with nodes labelled with composite choices. A leaf node is
a node such that a subset of the label is in explg. If a node is not a leaf node then
the children of the node labelled with j are labelled with the splits of j on alternate v
(where v \ j  fg).
If the root of the tree is an explanation of g, then no matter which choice is made
for the alternative to split on, there can be no branches that do not lead to leaves, as
eventually we will end up with nodes labelled with total choices, and a subset of a
total node is in explg as explg is a covering set of explanations of g.
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Suppose j is a minimal explanation of g. Consider a minimal (in the number of
nodes on the tree) splitting tree with a root labelled with j. Claim: this splitting tree
can be converted into sequence of resolutions that will derive j. This will be carried
out bottom up. Replace each leaf node by the element of explg that it covers. For
each non-root node, when all of its children have been replaced, then we can replace
it by the resolution of its replaced children on the alternative on which it was split.
The only thing we need to demonstrate is that each of the replaced children contain
one element of the splitting alternative (and so can be resolved together). Suppose
one child does not contain an element of the splitting alternative, then this split
can be replaced by subtree at that node, and we get a smaller splitting tree, which
contradicts the minimality of the splitting tree. 
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